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Rethinking the Establecimientos
WHY APACHES SETILED ON SPANISH-RUN RESERVATIONS,

17 86- 1793

Matthew Babcock

W

ithin the first seven months after Viceroy Bernardo de Galvez issued
his well-known "Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces of
New Spain" in late August 1786, three groups of Apaches sought peace at
Spanish presidios in Sonora and Nueva Vizcaya, both frontier provinces of
northern New Spain.' The Chiricahuas acted first. On 10 September 1786,
several bands requested peace with .Ensign Domingo de Vergara in their
Chiricahua mountain homeland north of the presidial line in Sonora.
Vergara, a native of Eibar in the Basque Country of Spain, was an effective
and well-respected field officer and diplomat in the Opata garrison at
Bacoachi. After more than three weeks of talks in the Apacherfa, Chief
Isose and twenty-three Chiricahua emissaries, including some Spanish-born
captives who had married into the tribe, accompanied Vergara to the Spanish presidio of Fronteras, where they discussed the prospects of settling near
Bacoachi. In December twenty Chiricahua families camped near the garrisoned town, and by mid-March 1787, more than a hundred families had
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moved into the district, constituting well over four hundred people. 2 Simultaneously, three hundred miles to the east, eight Mescalero headmen, whose
bands numbered more than two hundred families, made peace with Capt.
Domingo Diaz at Presidio del Norte, which stood at the confluence of the
Rio Conchos and the Rio Grande in northeastern Nueva Vizcaya. Lastly, as
the snow began to melt off the highest peaks of the western Sierra Madre,
eastern Chiricahuas, whom Spaniards called Mimbrefios, sought peace in
northwestern Nueva Vizcaya. Two Mimbrefio chiefs, Inclan (known as El
Zurdo or "the left-handed one" to the Spaniards) and Nataniju, presented
themselves to Lt. Col. Antonio Cordero at Janos Presidio that same March,
stating they wished to settle at El Paso del Norte and in the San Buenavenhlf?
valley. By early April, two Mimbrefio camps stood within half a league of
San Buenaventura Presidio, and a month later Cordero estimated that five
hundred peaceful Mimbrefios had moved into the surrounding valley.3
Why did so many Athapaskan groups from the Rio Pecos to the Rio Gila
decide to give up their independence and frequent livestock raids on Spanish settlements, which they had enjoyed for more than a century, to settle
on reservations? Few scholars have adequately addressed this question. 4 I
argue that Apaches settled in these fixed locations for three main reasons:
protection from Spanish soldiers and Indian enemies, material benefits
gained within the system, and the realization that they could manipulate
the system to work in their favor. In other words, Apaches settled on reservations for many of the same reasons that Indian groups across Spanish America
entered Catholic missions. That soldiers tried to make Indians materially
dependent rather than convert them to Catholicism as the first step in the
acculturation process serves as the principal difference between Spanish
reservations and missions. 5
Specialists understand that Apaches and Euroarnericans have a long history of contact dating back at least to the Spanish colonization of New Mexico
in the 159os.6 Few historians of the nineteenth-century American West, however, are aware that thousands of Apaches, including the relatives of wellknown future chiefs such as Juan Jose Compa, Mangas Coloradas, and
Cochise, entered Spanish reservations nearly a century before Geronimo's
surrender in 1886. Frequently these same scholars mistakenly assume that
the Spanish and Mexican military only minimally impacted Apache culture, their soldiers "could do next to nothing to control the Apaches," and
Apaches' first significant contact with outsiders began when Anglo Americans entered the region in significant numbers during the 1840s.7 Mexican
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scholars, on the other hand, are much better versed in Apache history prior
to 1846. They, too, however, regard Apaches as indios bdrbaros or savages
owing to the escalation of Apache raiding in northern Mexico during the
183os.8 Even most regional specialists concur that Apache groups never made
lasting peace agreements with Spaniards. These historians view the mission, not the presidio, as the primary institution for "civilizing" Apaches in
the region and ignore the presidio's role as a reservation agency.9
Challenging these assumptions, this essay examines Apache motives for
entering a forgotten system of reservation-like establecimientos (establishments or settlements) during the 1780s, where some groups of Arivaipas,
Pinalefios, and Tcmtos-collectively dubbed Western Apaches by twentieth-century anthropologists-and Mescaleros and Chiricahuas had resided
for more than forty years. Borderlands specialists may be surprised to learn
that although Spaniards routinely used the expression Apaches de paz
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(Apaches at peace), they did not use establecimientos de paz. This phrase
and its various English equivalents-peace establishments or peace settlements - have been concocted by Mexican and American scholars. Although
"reservation;' is not a literal translation of establecimiento either, this term
more accurately reflects the degree of control the Spanish military exercised over peaceful Apache communities and places the system in a broader
comparative context. 1O In his "Instructions for Dealing with Apaches at
Peace," which refined the policy of the deceased Viceroy Galvez, commander-in-chief of the Interior Provinces Pedro de Nava ordered in 1791
that "The territory that each [Apache] rancherfa occupies should be specified, as well as the distance from the principal post." Every week Spanish
officers recorded the rations and supplies they issued to Apaches in an account book. Each month commanding officers recorded the total number
ofApaches in each band, noting marital status, gender, and age. IfApaches
left their specified boundaries for any reason, they had to obtain a written
passport from the commandeL II
"Reserved areas for indigenous populations," then, were not simply a
product of the nineteenth-century United States. They began on Spanish
and British colonial frontiers in Europe, North Mrica, and North America,
where the establecimientos constituted one of the most extensive systems
on the continent. 12 Although Apaches would come and go frequently from
the presidios in the early years, the peaceful Apache population had stabilized and begun to grow by 1790. Approximately two thousand Apaches,
from a variety of tribes that Spaniards called Mescaleros, Faraones,
Mimbrefios, Chiricaguis, Gilefios, and Tontos, had settled in eight
establecimientos situated near seven presidios in Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora
and in the sparsely inhabited agricultural community of Sabinal, south of
Belen on the Rio Grande in New Mexico by 1793.!3 Some of these bands
would remain at peace well into the Mexican national period, until presidial
troops stopped issuing rations to them in 1831.
Protection
Portions of all Apache groups sought protection from the intensified
offensives of Spanish soldiers and their growing number of Indian allies
between 1786 and 1793. The Mescaleros made peace at Presidio del Norte
in 1787 partly because it offered refuge from the military operations of Spanish
troops and their Indian allies, including the Comanches and Jicarillas. The
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situation west of the Rio Grande was more complex. Spaniards intended to
squeeze the Chiricahuas and Mimbrefios between three pincers: Spanish,
Pima, and Opata garrisons from the south; Spanish troops, Pueblo auxiliaries, Navajos, and Utes from the north; and Comanches from the east. Not
all, however, went as planned. Spaniards and Indians succeeded in pushing
many bands southward. Apaches could still find food in the pine-oak forests
of the western Sierra Madre and free-range cattle herds of exposed Spanish
ranches, and very few of those groups living west of the Rio Grande requested peace because of military pressure alone.
After nearly a century of warfare between Spaniards and Apaches in northern New Spain, the accommodation they reached in the late 1780s represented a profound military change, which Borderlands scholars have
generally attributed to Spanish military pressure. "Probably the greatest
military advantage which the Spaniards enjoyed over the Indians," historian Donald E. Worcester has argued, "was their organization and discipline. Even the most warlike tribes rarely could resist a well-concerted
charge."14 Worcester's statement ignores the Spanish military's limited success in making well-concerted charges on Apaches for most of the eighteenth century because of the tribe's high degree of organization in their
raiding and warfare. Apaches outnumbered Spanish troops and were difficult to engage directly. After striking quickly at night, Apache warriors retreated to remote and rugged regions of the sierras, where the Spanish could
not easily surprise them, horses traveled with difficulty, and water sources
were hard to find. As a result, Spanish presidiales (presidio troops) frequently
returned from campaigns with their horses broken down and provisions
completely exhausted, waiting several months to be resuppliedY
By the 1780s, however, Spaniards had abandoned the "well-concerted
charge." Rather than relying on European linear tactics to defeat Apache
warriors in open battle, frontier officers began reforming their approach to
warfare by applying guerrilla or Indian-style tactics. Although Bourbon bureaucrats in Madrid, Spain, and Mexico City encouraged the heightened
militarization of New Spain's northern frontier in the late eighteenth century, the impetus for many of the reforms stemmed from the periphery rather
than the core. Commander-in-chief Teodoro de Croix, for example, responded to the poor state of the region's defenses by increasing northern
New Spain's troops by 932 men between 1776 and 1783. A large percentage
of the addition consisted of companies of trapa ligera or light troops, who
wore lighter armor and carried fewer weapons and horses and more mules
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than typical presidial soldiers. These troops could move more quickly than
ordinary cavalry whether on horseback in flat terrain or on foot in rugged
terrain. Field officers continued to standardize guerrilla tactics under commanders-in-chiefFelipe de Neve and Jacobo Ugarte's leadership in the 1780s.
Tucson captain Pedro de Allande, for example, wrote that he and his men
often spent "the cold nights without a campfire" in an effort to "more surely
surprise and punish" Apaches. Coahuila governor Juan de Ugalde took further steps. His frontier-born Spanish scouts wore buckskin breeches and
jackets and carried brown cloaks and blankets, which Ugalde believed "the
best color to prevent their being seen from afar." Similarly, his men carried
muskets with barrels of blued steel to prevent their flashing in the sunlight.
When attacking Mescaleros, his scouts even wore Mescalero moccasins so
that their tracks would not alert the enemy of their presence. Ugalde also
employed other Indian tactics, such as advancing only at night when his
troops were close to Apache rancherfas· (settlements or encampments), attacking at dawn, and dividing into separate squads of fourteen men each to
maximize surprise and avoid detection. 16
Like these other frontier officers, Viceroy Galvez, who had personally
fought Apaches before assuming office in Mexico City in 1785, believed
that attacking Apaches in their own camps was the only effective way of
punishing them and bringing peace to the frontier. To increase the effectiveness of these operations, Galvez advocated additional tactical changes.
First, he wanted small parties of regular troops commanded by seasoned
frontier officers to do the fighting. By keeping the detachments between 150
and 200 men and further dividing them upon attack, he hoped that he could
retain an element of surprise. He also believed that regular troops were
better at finding pasture and water and staying quiet than frontier militia. 17
Along with stealth, timed offensives and increased coordination were
two of the key tactical changes that enabled Spanish troops to reach more
Apache families in their camps. Spanish officers were well aware that Apache
groups, such as the Mescaleros, typically traveled southward to lower elevations at the approach of winter and southern groups moved northward to
higher elevations in the summer. On 22 July 1777, Irish-born inspector-inchief Hugo O'Conor reported that troops would carry out special punitive
campaigns "against the western Apaches who inhabit the sierras of
Chiricagui, Gila, and that of the Mimbres, from which the immoderate
colds of the months of December, January and February oblige them therefore to seek refuge in other areas of more moderate temperature." O'Conor
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wanted three divisions to converge on Apaches in the Sierra del Hacha (the
Hatchet Mountains in present southwestern New Mexico) from different
directions, "where, as in other indicated places, they will surely find the
enemies occupied making mescal, which forms a great part of their subsistence." O'Conor also aimed to capitalize on the next Apache migratory
shift. He understood that in mid-April these same Indians returned northward with their mescal crop to the Sierra de los Mimbres "to plant their
corns, beans, and squash in the canyons of that same sierra." Here, O'Conor
thought, was a second time to ambush the Apaches, when they were sedentary and most vulnerable. O'Conor believed 250 men commanded by an
officer who knew their territory would be sufficient to accomplish the task. ls
When New Mexico governor Fernando de la Concha lengthened the
duration of these expeditions into the Apacherfa in 1788, they became even
more effective. In 1784 Concha's predecessor, Juan Bautista de Anza, had
initiated a system of monthly campaigns, departing between 15 July and
early November, into the Gila and Mimbres mountains. Concha, however,
quickly recognized the futility of the policy. Given that the ranges lay more
than one hundred leagues from Santa Fe and took two weeks to reach on a
one-month campaign, troops only fought for two days. Instead, in the summer of 1788, Concha implemented a new tactical plan: departing in late
August, two columns converged on the same mountain ranges and operated for sixty to seventy days.19
In general troops from Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, and New Mexico effectively organized their offensives to maximize military pressure on the
Apaches. Forces in Coahuila and Texas, because of policy differences toward the Apaches, worked together much less efficiently. Finally, the least
successful coordination was demonstrated in defensive operations in all these
provinces. The increased level of offensive cooperation in the late colonial
period stands in marked contrast to the highly localized offensive and defensive Indian campaigns that presidiales waged previously and to which
northern Mexican militias would revert between 1821 and 1846.20
In addition to tactical changes, Spanish officials made important personnel changes in their military offensives in the 1770S and 1780s. Their primary goal focused on the use of peaceful Indians, including Apaches de
paz, as auxiliaries to intimidate and dishearten independent Apaches "to
such a degree that one or more of the Apache groups sue for peace." Between 1777 and 1784, Croix and Neve pragmatically increased the overall
fighting strength of northern New Spain's chronically undermanned presidial
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troops by employing Opata- and Pima-mission Indians in their own separate fighting units, rather than as auxiliaries alongside Spanish troops. Commanded in the field by their own elected officers, these Native-manned
flying companies proved especially effective in combating Apache groups
west of the Rio Grande in the 1780s from posts at Bavispe, Bacoachi, and
Tubac in Sonora. 21
Although Croix primarily utilized these troops to defend their settlements
from Apache attacks, the succeeding commanders-in-chief, beginning with
Neve, employed them offensively in the Apacherfa. In contrast to Spanish
presidiales, Neve wrote in 1783, "Indian companies ... have the known
advantage of not casting shadows, making noise, or making a cloud of dust;
they conceal themselves with ease, even in flat terrain, and they discover
the enemy and are able to surprise them with more frequency and certainty." As infantry these Indians were especially valuable in operations
against Native camps hidden in the Apacherfa's remote and broken terrain,
where Spanish cavalry could not penetrate. Thus, Opata- and Pima-mission Indians, who were motivated to fight for the Spaniards because they,
too, suffered grievously from Apache raids, made significant headway against
Apache groups west of the Rio Grande; their successes helped compel some
Apache bands to make peace.n
In the late 1780s, when the majority of Apaches first entered the
establecimientos, these mixed ethnic forces from Sonora and Nueva Vizcaya
worked in tandem with Pueblo auxiliaries and Spanish troops who operated
from New Mexico and drove Gilefio Apaches southward. Much like Pimas
and Opatas in Sonora, Pueblos had loyally served Spanish interests for most
of the eighteenth century, beginning with their first unified campaign against
Faraon Apaches in the Sandia Mountains during the spring of 1704. By the
mid-eighteenth century, Spaniards had organized Pueblos into separate infantry units, with the same command structure later employed by Croix,
and increasingly used them in offensive military campaigns. Although Pueblo
auxiliaries did not utilize firearms or horses to any significant degree until
after 1800, Spanish officials praised their agility, physical stamina, and knowledge of Apache territory and fighting tactics. They provided the backbone
of Native assistance to New Mexicans in their Gilefio campaigns from 1786
to 1788, and clearly influenced some Apaches to seek peaceY
In addition to employing mission Indians, as part of Ugarte's so-called
"grand strategy" for bringing the Apaches to peace, Spanish officers formed
military alliances with different Native groups. Texas governor Domingo
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Cabello signed a peace treaty with eastern Comanches in San Antonio in
October 1785, and New Mexico governor Anza reached a similar agreement with western Comanche divisions in Santa Fe in February 1786. Helping Spaniards fight Apaches was in no way a concession on the Comanches'
part. They had been waging war on Apaches since their arrival on the Southern Plains from the Great Basin in the early eighteenth century. In the fall
of 1776, Comanches dealt a significant blow to eastern Apaches when they
slaughtered three hundred families who were butchering buffalo along the
Rio Colorado in Texas. Indeed, responding to Comanche, rather than Spanish, territorial expansion, the Lipanes, Mescaleros, and Jicarillas chose to
move to the southern and western peripheries of the buffalo Plains. 24
Jicarilla Apaches and Utes, who had guided and fought alongside Governor Anza's New Mexican forces against the Comanches in 1779, also agreed
to join Spanish military campaigns against the Apaches in New Mexico.
The Jicarillas strengthened their alliance in New Mexico by campaigning
with Santa Fe presidial soldiers against Mescalero Apaches in the Sierra
Blanca in October 1787 in exchange for Spanish military protection on their
fall buffalo hunt into the Comancherfa. The Utes had been loyal Spanish
allies in New Mexico since at least 1735 and had served as auxiliaries against
Comanches since the 1760s. Perhaps because the smallpox epidemic of 1781
nearly exterminated them, the Utes agreed to an alliance with the
Comanches in 1786. Now with the Comanches at peace, Anza urged the
Utes to redirect their campaigns to southwest of Santa Fe against the Gila
Apaches. 25
Finally, on the western front, Governor Anza succeeded in weakening
the nine-year Gilefio-Navajo alliance, which Spaniards had been trying to
break since 1783. Combining the threat of Comanche attacks with a trade
ban, Anza pressured a faction of the Athapaskan-speaking Navajos into severing their alliance with Gilefio Apaches in March 1786. Navajos agreed to
war on them instead. Navajo leaders Carlos and Antonio Pinto told Anza
that their tribe had suffered from famine as a result of the ban, indicating
that the reestablishment of trade with Pueblos and Spaniards appears to
have been a strong motivation for making peace. 26 Comanches and Navajos
eventually launched a series of attacks on eastern and western Apache
rancherfas both with Spanish forces and independently between the summer of 1786 and the summer of 1790.
In practice, however, no matter how impressive these alliances appeared
on paper, Comanches, Navajos, and Utes contributed little to Spanish
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campaigns against Mimbrefios and Chiricahuas. In four joint campaigns
originating from New Mexico in 1786 and 1787, Comanches, Spaniards,
Pueblos, and Navajos killed or captured only twenty-five Apaches living
west of the Rio Grande, while Comanches alone suffered thirteen casualties. Comanches might have been more excited about fighting alongside
Spaniards had they received the quantity of weapons and supplies promised
them in the 1786 treaty. Instead, because of budget limitations, Commanderin-chief Ugarte could only afford to furnish the most well-known chiefs
with muskets, and he ordered presidial captains to supply Comanche allies
with cigarros (cigars), sugar, and the bare minimum of food to sustain them
on their campaigns. Comanches also lost faith in the dependability of Spanish troops when Ensign Salvador Rivera's men retreated during the heat of
battle in September 1787, leaving only Comanches to fight the Mimbrefios.
Finally, no evidence indicates that Utes served on any expeditions against
the Apaches. Instead, Utes and Comanches continued to attack each other
after 1786, and eventually broke their unstable alliance in early 1792.27
Just as they did prior to 1786, Comanches achieved the best results against
eastern Apaches when fighting them independently from the Spaniards. In
late April 1787, after Lt. Col. Juan de Ugalde had spent months tracking
eastern Apache bands unsuccessfully, Comanches wiped out a large
Mescalero band at a waterhole, where tobacco grew, near El Paso del Norte.
At the end ofJuly 1787, ninety-five Comanche allies, under chiefYsampampi,
led a successful campaign against the Faraon Apaches at the southern end
of the Sierra Blanca range. The Comanches killed five Faraones, took thirtyfive captives, and captured sixteen horses, while they suffered only five casualties. By mid-January 1788, Ugarte believed that the Comanches had
successfully driven the Apaches out of the Sierra Blanca and noted that
they also pursued them in the Rio Grande valley.28
The extent of the Spanish-Navajo alliance in the west should also not be
exaggerated. In June 1785, prior to the negotiation of an alliance by New
Mexico governor Anza, the Navajos participated in their most successful
punitive expedition, during which five headmen led 150 Navajos and 94
Pueblo auxiliaries from Laguna Pueblo to Gilefio Apache camps in the
Datil Mountains, west of present-day Socorro, New Mexico. The expedition killed more than forty Gilefios with only two Navajo casualties. The
high number of Gilefio casualties probably resulted from the Navajos divulging the hidden locations of the Apaches' rancherfas. At this time, Navajos had a strong incentive to comply with Spanish interests: they wanted
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Anza to resanction Spanish trade in New Mexico. The majority of the Navajos, including the principal Navajo diplomat Antonio El Pinto, however,
continued to honor their raiding and trading alliances with Apache groups
west of the Rio Grande. z9 To that end, Navajos may have used Spanish horses,
muskets, and ammunition for their own purposes when raiding Spanish settlements or exchanging with Apaches.
"Suffering no doubt from the invasions of their mountain strongholds by
Anza's New Mexican forces and new Navaho allies," the Mimbrenos, according to one scholar, requested peace at Janos in May 1787.30 Yet no hard
evidence supports this statement. As we have seen, Navajos launched only
one significant attack on western Apache camps in 1785. Furthermore, Navajos had close kinship and political ties to multiple Chiricahua groups,
including the ones who made peace. Navajo chief Kasgoslan, for example,
was the brother of the prominent "peaceful" Chiricahua chief El Compa,
who settled first at Bacoachi and later at Janos. At Mimbreno chiefEl Zurdo's
request, Kasgoslan and several other Navajo leaders even took part in the
peace proceedings with the Mimbrenos at Janos in the spring of 1787.31 Thus,
the Navajos could exert their geopolitical influence in a variety of ways
beyond the bounds of Spanish control.
More important was that although each Indian alliance had its own limitations, they worked well enough together, combined with the Comanches'
efforts east of the Rio Grande, to influence most Mescaleros and some
Chiricahua and Western Apache bands to move southward. By employing
O'Conor's and Concha's tactical changes and relying on the scouting skills
of Indian allies, these coordinated multiethnic expeditions succeeded in
reaching Apache camps more frequently in the 1780s than ever beforesometimes with devastating effect. On 24 May 1786, after spotting Apache
fires in the Florida Mountains, Spanish and Opata troops attacked the camp,
killing five Indians and "burn[ing] down the rancherfa with an incredible
amount of pillage without even leaving the poles of the huts."When troops
failed to kill or capture Apaches or destroy their homes, they targeted their
crops. In September 1788, Antonio El Pinto guided Concha to a "halfmatured" eastern Chiricahua cornfield near the Mimbres Mountains. Although
the Apaches remained beyond his troops' grasp, Concha "had the ears pulled
off the stalks and trampled by the horses before the eyes of three Apaches,"
who stood on a nearby mountaintop. Five days later, when Concha's scouts
looked for Apache tracks, they "found and destroyed a cornfield in the
direction of the Tecolote [probably the Cuchillo Negro Mountains]." As
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Concha undoubtedly knew, corn began to ripen in September, and Apaches
harvested it in October. 32 Clearly, as Spaniards intensified their offensives
on Apache camps just before harvest time, they disrupted the eastern
Chiricahua food supply. Targeting Apache crops, however, unwittingly encouraged many Apaches to resort to raiding for subsistence at the same time
other Spanish officials were asking presidiales to "teach" settled Apaches
how to farm outside the presidios. Apaches, then, still had options besides
making peace with Spaniards.
Some Spanish officials, such as commanders-in-chief Croix and Neve,
also hoped to deprive Apaches of their staple mescal plant. In 1780, after
researching the plant as carefully as a twenty-first-century botanist, however, Croix's legal advisor Pedro Galindo Navarro determined that mescal
was far too abundant to wipe out. The plant "naturally increased without
cultivation, nor any care in almost all of the lands ofthese provinces," Galindo
Navarro wrote, and "it is so prevalent that the Apaches subsist on it during
the seasons." Coordinated Spanish campaigns threatened their safety, especially in their low-elevation winter camps, but Mescalero and Chiricahua
Apaches continued to eat mescal during this period. As Galindo Navarro
observed, some Apache groups made "their annual harvest (which they call
mescalear) in the Paraje de la Boca and other harvests not far from Janos
presidio, where the plants reproduce with the most abundance." Harvest
locales, then, represented another reason some Apaches likely sought peace.
Women and children, who were especially vulnerable to capture when they
gathered mescal along southward facing arroyos and mountain slopes from
November to May, could clearly benefit from Spanish protection. Apache
women also needed a reliable water source to process mescal hearts, and
presidios were generally situated along river valleys.J3
Once Apaches de paz began joining Spanish offensives in the late 1780s,
independent Apaches' need for protection grew stronger. During the winter
of 1788, Chiricahuas de paz at Bacoachi began guiding Spaniards northward to Mimbrefio camps. The Spanish-born captive Jose Gonzales commanded the Apache auxiliaries on the expedition and personally killed or
captured ten Apaches. Ugarte promoted Gonzales to ensign and noted that
the Chiricahuas' intimate knowledge of the Apacherfa enabled Spaniards
to locate numerous hidden Apache camps for the first time. Chiricahuas de
paz also demonstrated their effectiveness south of the presidio line in Nueva
Vizcaya, where their efforts in the western Sierra Madre directly influenced the Mimbrefio leader Yagonglf, or Ojos Colorados as the Spaniards
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called him, to seek peace at Janos in March 1790. Finally, ChiefNautilnilce's
Aravaipa Apache auxiliaries, who settled at Tucson in January 1793, killed
seven "rebellious" Western Apaches "whose heads he presented to the commander" in April. This attack, along with repeated Aravaipa offensives made
in conjunction with Spanish troops, persuaded chiefs Quitola and
Quinanzos and sixty-nine Western Apaches to make peace at Tucson in
spring 1793. 14 Although mission and independent Indians initially operated
together to elevate the success of Spanish campaigns in the West, the addition ofApaches de paz compelled even more independent Apaches to settle
near the presidios.
The scenario east of the Rio Grande was different in one major respect:
the most intense military pressure came from the north rather than the
south. Based on their own testimony to Spanish officials, Mescalero Apaches
sought peace with Spaniards at posts in Nueva Vizcaya primarily because
they wanted protection from Comanche aggression. Two high-ranking Spanish officers explained that no single Spanish or Comanche attack prompted
the Mescaleros to request peace initially from Ensign Juan Francisco
Granados in February 1787. Instead, the Indians realized that they were
trapped between these two superior military forces, the Comanches posing
a greater threat than the Spaniards. Like numerous other eastern Apache
groups since the mid-eighteenth century, the Mescaleros specifically told
Capt. Domingo Dfaz that they sought relief from Comanche attacks and
asked that Spanish troops escort them during their annual fall buffalo hunt
northward into the Comancherfa. Inspector-in-chief Jose Antonio Rengel
further validated the Mescaleros' claim when he offered two of their chiefs,
Patule el Grande and El Quemado, the option of settling in the abandoned
agricultural community of Los Tiburcios near El Paso in present-day Chihuahua. In large part, Rengel presented this opportunity to the Apache chiefs,
so they would be farther away from the Comanches' rapid southward expansion. 35 Finally, in December 1787, after the Mescaleros had been residing at Presidio del Norte for nine months, Ugarte reported, "The Mescaleros
did not dare to retreat to the North out of fear of meeting Comanche groups
that cross in pursuit of them and the Gilefios."
Other Mescalero bands sought peace at El Paso for the same reasons. On
22 May 1787, an Apache chief, camped north of the Rio Grande in the
Sacramento or Organ Mountains, asked Rengel to settle at El Paso. The
Apache chief told Rengel he feared the Comanches, who had just wiped
out a large Mescalero band in late April, and promised to return in three
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days with his people. J6 This story, then, shows a clear correlation between a
Comanche attack and Apaches seeking peace for protection.
Spanish military pressure was also a factor in the Mescalero decision to
make peace at Presidio del Norte in 1787, but it came from the south, not
the north. According to Chief Zapato Tuerto, as soon as the Mescaleros
learned that Coahuila governor Ugalde was returning to the frontier in February to attack them, they started negotiating. In fact the "skittishness" the
Mescaleros displayed in their initial encounter with Granados's men may
have been a consequence of their mistaking him for Ugalde. Even after
Granados dispelled this initial concern, however, the Mescaleros still had
good reason to be suspicious. Less than five years earlier, in April 1782, a
Mescalero headman, who had been leading raids in the rugged and desolate Bolson de Mapimf that stretched across Coahuila, Nueva Vizcaya, and
Durango, claimed that he had requested peace in El Paso because of Ugalde's
attacks. Commander-in-chief Croix agreed to discuss peace with him, provided that the Mescaleros ceased their raiding at Mapimf and Cuencame
and surrendered. Three headmen and 137 Apaches came in, but Croix deceived them, deporting the group to the interior as prisoners of war. This
prior experience with Spanish treachery and other similar incidences that
occurred among Chiricahuas and Mimbrei10s are vital to understanding
why peace-seeking Apaches were initially so distrustful of Spanish troops
despite promises of humane treatment. J7
The need for Spanish military protection alone was enough for some
Apaches to sit down at the bargaining table, but they only agreed to settle on
reservations with a lot of reassurance and many diplomatic concessions from
Spaniards. Although the Indians had previously settled at Presidio del Norte
in 1779, two months of preliminary negotiations passed before Spaniards
convinced the Mescaleros to return there. Even then, the Mescaleros carried a copy of the agreement from 1779 for leverage in the proceedings.
Only after significantly modifying the initial terms of the treaty to suit their
needs did the Mescaleros agree to come to Presidio del Norte again.
Similarly, Chiricahuas and Mimbrefios drove hard bargains with Ensign
Vergara before portions of those groups agreed to settle at Bacoachi and
Janos, respectively. In March 1787, at Janos, Ugarte sent Vergara three
Apaches de paz and two Spanish soldiers to assure the Mimbrefios residing
in the Sierra de la Bola that Spaniards would not kill or imprison their
emissaries again. Four days later, Vergara, accompanied by El Zurdo, four
young men, and four women, returned from the Mimbrefio camps. "The
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famous chief Nataniju," who had solicited peace at Janos with El Zurdo in
1778, promised to come down soon and settle in the San Buenaventura
valley. Shocked at the Apaches' compliance, Ugarte told Jose de Galvez, "I
confess to your Excellency that I am amazed ... by the wonderful judgments of God." Ugarte thought the Apaches west of the Rio Grande had
"the best intentions ofsettling in formal towns, ceasing their hostilities all at
once on our side and theirs." In Ugarte's view, Vergara deserved most of the
credit. During his "repeated departures" to their camps, Vergara had "courted
them with what he had been able to attract them with" and had won "their
confidence and affection." Ugarte rewarded Vergara for his efforts with a
promotion to first lieutenant and even recommended him for captain. Ugarte
also recommended that the king bestow special recognition on Vergara for
"his zeal, aptitude for war, generosity with which he has spent as much as
he had until he persisted, [and] thought and confidence that he warrants
from the Apaches, having been the principal instrument that God has chosen to put them in the good state that they are in."38

The Fruits of Peace
After more than a century of violent conflict and treacherous acts on both
sides, faithful diplomacy was essential to building trust between Spaniards
and Apaches. In addition to seeking Spanish military protection, Apaches
also wanted as many material benefits within the establecimientos as Spaniards were willing to offer them. These consisted of food rations, gifts, spoils
from battle, trading privileges in neighboring pueblos, and, most important
from an Apache perspective, the recovery of captured kinsmen. In exchange
Apaches agreed to return their Spanish-born captives and unbranded livestock, stop their raids into Spanish territory, and help Spaniards defeat other
independent Apache groups.
Apaches east and west of the Rio Grande requested food rations when
provisions were low as a result of environmental stress or the strains of war.
As a condition for making peace at Presidio del Norte in spring 1787, the
Mescaleros persuaded Capt. Domingo Dfaz to issue the bands rations although Ugarte's initial terms forbade this measure. Chiricahuas and
Mimbrefios also asked for rations at Bacoachi in the fall of 1786 and at Janos
in the spring of 1787.39
Apaches likely sought these provisions for three reasons. First, they wanted
to avoid the risk of ambush by their enemies, particularly the Comanches,
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while hunting, gathering, or farming in their own territory. Second, a prolonged regional drought may have diminished their food supply. The
Mescalero "Nation," Diaz explained, exists "in total poverty as much from
the small number of horses they have, as from the scarcity of rains of these
past years, [for] the harvest has not supplied them with their fruits, with
which they sustain themselves for part of the year." Spanish troops also suffered from this drought. Owing to "the scarcity of corn and other provisions" at Presidio del Norte, Diaz ordered three hundred fanegas (bushels)
of seeds from El Paso to supply the Mescaleros de paz for the rest of April
and May.40 Finally, early frosts resulting from the Little Ice Age, which lasted
approximately from 1300 to 1850, wiped out Spanish crops and probably
ravaged Apache plantings as well. The most devastating frost struck Nueva
Vizcaya on 27 August 1786, completely destroying the fall harvest. That same
year, Galvez wrote that Nueva Vizcaya was "a province notably afflicted
with the rigors of war and with illness and the scarcity of food." These losses
created a food shortage, prices skyrocketed, and famine and disease spread
across the region. According to Bishop Esteban Lorenzo de Tristan, half of
Nueva Vizcaya's population died. Galvez, in fact, died of a fever from this
same epidemic in 1786.41
The trend of drought, disease, and early frost continued from Durango
to the Rio Grande Valley in 1788 and lasted until 1789. Scholars have argued that Indian raiding increased because of these environmental pressures. 42 Yet, the large number of Apaches requesting rations at the
establecimientos suggests that some Indians responded to these same environmental stresses by making peace.
Like other Indian tribes of the Southwest, peace-seeking Apache bands
also routinely sought gifts from Spanish officials as a sign of their friendship. During the fall of1786, small groups ofChiricahuas filed into Fronteras,
Sonora, to verify the peace settlement at Bacoachi and to test the Spaniards'
willingness to help them. Several Chiricahua men requested and received
Spanish horses to transport their families to Bacoachi. The Mescaleros
seemed even more adept than the Chiricahuas at extracting Spanish concessions. When Rengel met with Mescalero chiefs El Quemado and Patule
in El Paso the following spring, he issued horses to both men, a Spanish suit
to El Quemado (Patule had received one already), and hats or shirts to each
of the six young men accompanying the chiefs. Likewise, instead of giving
gifts to a single principal chief as Ugarte had intended, Diaz bestowed gifts
on all eight Mescalero band leaders at El Norte and their kinsmen in June.
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These Spanish overtures held symbolic importance for Apaches. Whenever
someone gave a gift outright without requesting one in return, the Apaches
held the gift-giver in high esteem for his or her generosity and wealthY
By serving as scouts and auxiliaries in Spanish military campaigns, Apache
men could also acquire unbranded horses and other spoils from battle. Although they usually attacked rival Apache groups in addition to their own
kinsmen, peaceful Apache scouts and auxiliaries could still enhance their
prestige by redistributing these items as status goods among their people. 44
These material benefits translated into social and political power; peaceful
Apache chiefs and young men of rising status agreed to perform this scouting or war service both in treaty proceedings and in practice. They also had
valuable resources at their disposal to exchange as commodities with Spaniards and Native allies, including the Tarahumaras and the Navajos.
Finally, Spanish officials granted Apache men and women passports that
enabled them to trade animal skins, mescal, and other products with vecinos,
or townsfolk, in neighboring communities. In the treaty terms at Bacoachi
in 1786, Chiricahuas had secured an important concession: "to exchange
and sell their goods" in all Spanish towns without injury. Spanish officials
had typically tried to restrict all trade with Apaches because of the ongoing
war against them and their incorrect notion that Apaches were incapable of
producing any trade goods other than stolen livestock, the Indians' main
exchange commodity when under siege from all sides. Under normal circumstances, however, Chiricahuas manufactured a variety of trade products, including deer and antelope skins, mescal, coiled basketry, and pottery.
From an Apache perspective, gift exchange served as an important activity
for leaders seeking to enhance their political and social prestige and for the
establishment of fictive kinship ties with Spaniards. Western Apaches called
the custom ted6'di (to exchange gifts), and the process could be observed at
any time between members of the same sex. Its key component was usually
reciprocity: when an Apache man or woman gave a gift, such as a horse,
knife, or dress, they typically expected the other person to give something in
return. The parties involved did not need to exchange the same type of item
or even one of equal value. In fact, part of the fun was trying to obtain the
best bargain. 4s
Perhaps recovering their kinsmen, captured by Spanish soldiers and their
Indian allies on military campaigns, represented the most important reason
for Apaches to make peace. In response to Mescalero demands at Presidio
del Norte, Ugarte ordered that all Mescalero men, women, and children
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imprisoned in Chihuahua and Santa Rosa and employed in the workhouses
of Encinillas, Mexico, be returned to their people in April 1787. During the
fall of 1788, in another extraordinary case, Chiricahua chief El Compa,
named principal chief of the peaceful Apaches at Janos by Commander-inchiefNava three years later, surrendered to Santa Cruz captain Manuel de
Echeagaray near the Gila River. El Compa and his children wanted to be
reunited with their wife and mother, whom Echeagaray held captive. Similarly, during negotiations with Lt. Col. Antonio Cordero in Chihuahua in
April 1791, Mimbrefio headmen demanded that Cordero return eleven prisoners, mostly women and children, before their bands would agree to settle
at establecimientos near Carrizal and Namiquipa. 46
Unfortunately, owing to chronic supply problems, Spanish presidial
commanders frequently failed to meet adequately the subsistence and
commercial needs of peaceful Apaches. Although seriously flawed, the
establecimiento system still offered Apache men the opportunity to hunt
game and Apache women the opportunity to harvest mescal without fear of
military attack. 47
Other Motives

Prior to settling on reservations, Apaches already recognized that they could
manipulate the system to suit their needs. They could draw on over a century's
worth of Spanish-contact experiences that included making short-term peace
agreements at presidios, settling in missions in Texas, and, of course, raiding
for livestock and captives at these same locations. By making peace with
Spaniards, Apache men and women knew that they could gain advance
knowledge of Spanish troop movements to help protect bands that remained
independent. In addition young Apache men understood that they could
use the establecimientos as bases for small-scale livestock raids in Spanish
territory.
During the late eighteenth century, numerous Spanish officials accused
Apaches of using peace as a pretext for obtaining information. When an
Indian appeared before the governor of El Paso to ask for peace on behalf of
Chief Chafalote in December 1778, Croix later concluded that "these pretensions had no other purpose, than of making, as long as they lasted, their
exchanges and acquiring information about our ideas." Similarly, in November 1786, two Lipan chiefs and six families tried to reinitiate trade, inactive for more than thirty-five years, with Pecos, New Mexico. Ugarte
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suspected, based on previous experiences in Coahuila, that "the commercial interests that they claimed were not their true motive." Noting the Lipans
are "the most refined and astute heathen Indians that we know," he believed they were intent on "finding out with this motive, the state of our
friendship and alliance with the Comanches."4B Although recovering captives and obtaining trade goods and information were viable motives for
short-term peace agreements, these reasons alone were insufficient cause
for Apaches to remain at the presidios. Similarly, both Apaches and Spaniards learned useful information about the other's plans, movements, and
resources from restored captives.
Finally, many Apaches continued to raid Spanish settlements even after
seeking peace. Spaniards had purposely positioned the majority of the
presidios along Apache raiding routes. Opportunistic Apache men saw the
establecimientos as a convenient way to keep their women and children
safe, while they raided for livestock and captives in other provinces. In the
past, the vast majority of Spanish officials, such as Janos lieutenant Narciso
de Tapia in 1778, had viewed truces with Athapaskans as "feigned and deceitful peaces" and commonly regarded Apache allies as "fake friends."49 In
his "Instructions" of 1786, Galvez correctly noted that the "inconveniences"
of making peace with semi-nomadic Apaches included the warriors "leav[ingJ
their families in safety" in order to carry out their raids "with greater peace
of mind" and "greater confidence, because they are better informed concerning our ideas, customs, and movements." Galvez, however, urged
presidial commanders to tolerate such raids. As Apaches themselves had
maintained many times, "they do not offend their friends by the harm which
they impute to other subjects of the king who live in territories where actually no peace has been made." In short, Galvez believed, "the deceitful
peace pacts of the Indians produce better results than open war."50 Thus, his
policy of "peace by deceit," which embraced peace at the local rather than
the provincial or state level, constituted peace on Native terms.

Conclusion
Those Mescaleros, Chiricahuas, and Western Apaches who made peace
and submitted to Spanish authority from 1786 to 1793 sought to protect their
people from Spaniards and other Indians, recover relatives, and reap the
material benefits of the establecimientos. Finding ways to make the system work in their favor undoubtedly facilitated that major step. Some
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Borderlands scholars have focused too exclusively on Spanish soldiers in
the field, but the coordinated military campaigns of Spaniards, Comanches,
Navajos, and Indian-manned flying companies after 1786 clearly placed extreme pressure on Apaches east and west of the Rio Grande. Although the
voices of Apache groups west of the Rio Grande are mostly silent, the
Mescaleros acknowledged that Comanche attacks were their primary motive for seeking peace. According to Commander-in-chiefUgarte, a combination of diplomacy and war brought about peace with the Chiricahuas,
Mimbrefios, and Mescaleros. He also maintained that Apaches had reduced
their raiding because of Spanish-led punitive expeditions that had transpired
on a monthly basis year-round. 51
Gathering a large number of Apache captives and prisoners of war constituted the principal military profit Spaniards and their Indian allies achieved
in the wars against Apaches after 1786. From 19 April 1786 to 31 December
1787, in all five Interior Provinces, Spaniards took 365 Apache prisoners,
while Apaches and their allies took only 30 Spaniards (table 1). By 12 June

1789, Spanish forces in Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, and New Mexico had captured 665 Apaches, over 90 percent of whom were women and children. 52
The disparity grew even wider once the reservation system solidified. From

1792 to 1795, independent Apaches reported only eight Spanish captives,
while Spaniards, with plenty of help from Apaches de paz, captured 674
Apache prisoners (table 1).
This Spanish military victory was hardly absolute. The killing on both
sides was nearly even. Between 1786 and 1787, Spaniards killed 328 Indians,
while Apaches and their allies killed 310 Spaniards, more than 75 percent of
whom were in Nueva Vizcaya. Most important, independent Apaches and
their allies maintained a corresponding advantage in stolen livestock. Apaches
and their allies captured 5,3°6 Spanish horses, mules, and cattle. Spaniards
recovered less than half (table 1). With such a large surplus, Apaches had a
means of bargaining with Spanish officers to recover their captives. Those
Apache families who retrieved their relatives often chose to make peace,
while those who did not either remained neutral or made war. Just as the
Spaniards combined diplomacy and war, so did the Apaches.
Cold winter temperatures and spring and fall frosts affected all peoples of
the Southwest Borderlands during the Little Ice Age and prompted Apaches
to come to the presidios to harvest mescal. Drought possibly helped influence
the Mescaleros to make peace at Presidio del Norte in 1787, but Spanish military protection, the Indians' principal need, enabled their collection of food,
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even in dry periods. Spaniards, however, could not guarantee the Apaches'
protection, especially if the Indians' camps were dispersed in surrounding
mountains, where they were vulnerable to attack from other Spaniards,
Comanches, or independent Apaches. Apaches de paz were also distressed by
Spanish Indian policy. Mimbrefio chiefYagnonglf (Ojos Colorados) resented
the Spaniards' supposedly "just policy" of combining peaceful diplomacy with
unrelenting warfare because it meant that they made war on his people at the
same time they asked for the Indians' loyalty and friendship.53
Finally, Apaches found various ways to gain advantages both during
and after the peace process. They extracted material advantages through
trade and gifts. By retaining at least a semisedentary mode of living and
refusing to become sedentary agriculturalists, Apaches maintained more
cultural independence than Spaniards initially intended. Some Apaches
de paz continued to raid for livestock south of the presidial line just as
they had in the past. Once the establecimiento system solidified in the
1790S, these transgressions occurred less frequently and intensely across
the northern frontier of New Spain, much like Galvez had hoped.
Even though Apaches had clear motivations for settling on Spanish-run
reservations, they never did so with the intention of becoming sedentary agriculhualists as the Spanish had envisioned. By continuing to gather wild plants,
hunt game, and conduct livestock raids on a small scale, these peaceful Apaches
met their subsistence needs when rations fell short and ensured their cultural
independence for more than forty years. At the same time, Spaniards benefited by avoiding the expense of a full-blown Apache war and from an overall
reduction in the frequency and intensity ofApache raids throughout the northern frontier of New Spain, allowing their population and economy to grow
and prosper. This imperfect but mutually beneficial peace indicates that accommodation, not just conflict, characterized Apache relations with Spaniards in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. More broadly,
Apaches would employ this same survival strategy again in the post-Civil
War era, when they raided for Mexican horses and livestock while U.S.
troops tried in vain to teach them farming techniques in the desert.
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